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CHAPTER XII  
 
ZORAN UDOVIČIĆ 
 
 
MEDIA IN B-H – THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INTERVENTION 
 
Introduction  
 
The past war (1992–1995) stopped the development of the media and almost destroyed 
the media infrastructure in B-H. Most of the media became a propaganda tool of the authorities, 
the military and other power centers that were created in the dissected territory of B-H. The 
Belgrade and Zagreb media houses competed in the territory of B-H for the interests of their 
States. A small number of media managed to retain (or win) their independent orientation. Three 
technical, program and status-divided RTV systems were created, under the influence of national 
oligarchies on the territories that were conquered (or retained) through military actions. Such a 
division left its mark on the state of the information system following the war.   
The international community was deeply involved in the stabilization and development of 
the media scene following the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). 
Almost all measures that arose from the letter and spirit of the GFAP were tested on the media. 
Few vocations in B-H were under such scrutiny as the media. Thus, the international community 
is greatly responsible for the renewal and reconstruction of the media that was carried out in the 
interest of peace and democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
This analysis will firstly provide an overview of the development and current state of the 
media sphere and demonstrate the post-Dayton politically legal framework of the media. It will 
follow on to provide the motive, forms and effects of international intervention. The conclusion 
aims to inspire thought on – where and how from here on. 
 
 
1. The Media Explosion and Stabilization  
 
At the beginning of 2001, 210 radio stations and 71 television stations emitted their 
programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Approximately 130 newspapers, magazines, journals and 
periodicals were published. Among them six daily papers (three in Sarajevo and two in Banja 
Luka) and 20 weeklies. Their circulation was small however (all six daily papers were printed in 
about 60 to 80 thousand copies daily). There were six news agencies, of which four had daily 
services (two from Sarajevo, one each from Mostar and Banja Luka)1. 
The media explosion had already begun during the war. Of the 54 radio stations and 5 TV 
stations that existed in 1991, the number rose to 156 radio stations and 52 TV stations in 1997. 
The cause of this expansion can be found above all in the fact that radio, and particularly 
television, were, both before and after the war, a very important weapon in the ethnic 
(nationalist), political and military propaganda. This expansion was favored by the end of the 
administrative ban on private bodies establishing media houses, and the chaotic state in the use 
of the frequency spectrum. There were no program or technical standards in its use. Of course, 
the international community had a positive influence on the media explosion and one that could 
not be neglected. Through vast donations, it supported the establishment of numerous media of 
independent orientation, in particular of radio and TV stations. The aim of this intervention was to 
create a pluralist media scene that would weaken the influence of the State, i.e. party, media. 
Minor local profiteers, who knew how to convert into money their verbal advocacy for democracy 
and freedom of the media found a niche in such a, more or less, uncontrolled media explosion.  
The media development in B-H can be divided into a number of phases over the past five 
years. The first phase is the immediate post-war period, when, following the end of military 
operations, the media continued their verbal war. The language of hate ruled within the State 
                                                
1 See more on www.mediaonline.ba, Media at the turning point – A media picture of B-H (Mediji na prekretnici - 
Medijska slika BiH), 2001. 
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media, and the newly developed media of independent orientation found it difficult to retain their 
function. The media area was parceled and divided. The international factor oversaw the State 
media, but its effect in eliminating the language of hate was minor. 
The second phase, which began immediately prior to the first post-war elections in the fall 
of 1996 was characterized by the establishment of a number of local media, independent of the 
politics of local authorities with the immense assistance of foreign donors. OHR and OSCE 
installed two large international projects in Bosnia – OBN television and Radio FERN, with the 
aim of making them a deciding influence on the creation of a more favorable democratic 
environment for the elections. The Belgrade and Zagreb media continued to have a propaganda 
influence in the media space in B-H. Programs in the local languages of West European 
countries (Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, France Internationale, Free Europe) started to 
appear on most of the local radio stations supported by the international community. On the basis 
of entitlements for Sintra, the High Representative for the first time applied one sanction on the 
media – SFOR took over the transmitters of Srpska RTV from Pale, while the seat of that 
television station was transferred to the more cooperative part of the Republika Srpska - Banja 
Luka.   
The third phase of change in the media picture was the beginning of the transformation of 
State radio and TV stations into public services. This process was initiated in 1998 but has not 
yet been completed. It was imposed, by his decisions and laws, by the High Representative, 
following unsuccessful attempts by the local authorities, the management and editorships of 
existing State RTV stations, to carry this out. It was planned that there would be two public Entity 
radio and TV stations and a Public Service for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It was also noted that 
the media expansion was not paralleled by quality. The international community began to invest 
large amounts of money into the education of journalists. The Independent Media Commission 
was established, as the head regulatory body in the field of radio diffusion (in March 2001, the 
Commission was integrated into the Regulatory Agency for Telecommunications that, under the 
supervision and management of foreigners, acts at the State level). It finally ended the illegally 
established system of the Croatian Radio Television in the Federation of B-H, i.e. the subsidiary 
of Croatian Radio Television from Zagreb. The language of hate, in its direct sense, has 
disappeared from most of the media. 
The final phase, which is underway, can be called the intention for stabilization, even 
though the effects of this intention are only partly visible. The international community has made 
a sharp turn in the support to media and is giving priority to the transformation of State electronic 
services, so that their untouched power during all the post-war years was now aimed at a greater 
effect in creating a democratic environment. At the same time, it ends the support it gave to 
international projects - OBN and FERN. The first was given to its local staff to manage it to the 
best of their abilities, while the other, with its staff and technical resources, was included in the 
newly established Public Radio B-H (BiH radio 1). In this phase, OHR and OSCE worked on the 
establishment of media legislation, in order to fix the chaotic situation in the media field, caused 
by the breakdown of the former State, the war and political obstruction of leading parties 
following the war. In the absence of political will of authorities in adopting adequate laws, OSCE 
developed proposals for laws regarding free access to information and libel, which are currently 
in the adoption procedure, and which should bring European standards of behavior into these 
fields.2  
In this current phase, the international community has initiated a new type of campaign for 
sustainability in the B-H media. Donations were drastically cut and the media that had survived 
on them found themselves on the brink of extinction. The media market had not begun to 
function, and most of the media were not qualified for even its rudimentary prospects. The 
Regulatory Agency for Telecommunication applied strong rules for renewal, i.e. the provision of 
long-term work permits. In the Tuzla region alone, 43 of the 63 radio and TV stations did not 
receive permits. Through the application of these criteria, it was possible to reduce the number of 
radio and TV stations by two thirds. Their current number still exceeds the possibilities and needs 
of public interest, public information and advertising, but in this situation it is possible that stations 
                                                
2 See more on www.oscebih.org  
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that had a significant influence on the establishment of a democratic atmosphere in certain parts 
of the country may disappear from the air and press.3   
The relationship of local authorities towards the media underwent two phases. The 
authorities, primarily out of nationalist interests, obstructed each action of the international 
community and thus blocked the entire process. They had a hold on "their" media, while the 
opposition and media of independent orientation were dubbed non-patriotic and antagonistic. 
During the second phase, during which the last elections of November 2000 were held, the 
authorities retreated into a state of quiet obstruction and disinterest for the processes developing 
in the media. Thus the political obstruction of authorities, as well as the apathetic atmosphere, 
the lack of understanding and resistance in the State electronic media, led the international 
factors to mainly make foreigners responsible for their reconstruction. The international 
community did not find a way to identify and support reform initiatives within the local forces. In 
this way a kind of semi-protectorate was introduced into the media field, although none of the 
international factors admit to this.   
 
 
2. The GFAP Framework for the Media 
 
The international media intervention mainly arose from the spirit, rather than the letter, of 
the GFAP. In fact, the Agreement, and, within its framework, the Constitution of B-H, hardly 
mentions anything about the media. It is only Article I.I. of Annex 10, that mentions the creation of 
a positive environment for holding elections, that states that "parties will ensure ... freedom of 
expression and press". The Constitution of B-H does not mention the media, within the 
jurisdiction of the State, not even those media that provide State identity – the State or public 
radio and television. Only indirectly, in Article III, Point 1 of the Constitution, where the jurisdiction 
of the B-H institutions are numbered, is the duty for "establishing and functioning of joint and 
international communications" mentioned. This formulation could be interpreted as the obligation 
of the State to regulate the issue of RTV frequencies, i.e. certain aspects of radio diffusion. The 
media were left to the jurisdiction of the Entities. In the FB-H, they were even further 
subordinated to the jurisdiction of the Canton. The logic of the Washington Treaty (1993), that led 
to the formation of the FB-H, was the same as that of the Dayton agreement – the media belong 
to the conflicting "sides". The "sides" fought for them in the war and have a right to them in 
peacetime.   
The witnesses of the birth of the Agreement on Dayton do not remember and do not 
mention whether there was talk of the media there at all. It could be supposed that the media did 
not fall under the priorities for which an agreement had to be reached. It definitely suited the local 
protagonists to dominate such a lethal weapon after the war. Dayton secured the same starting 
point for the media intervention of the international community, as well as for military and political 
intervention: separating the warring sides (media), and continuing work on renewal and 
reconstruction with their war mentors. Thus it was made possible that during the first postwar 
years, Momčilo Krajišnik (now in the Hague) and Velibor Ostojić (now missing), continued to 
manage the Srpska Radio Television, while the strongest propaganda actors of the Tudjman 
regime remained on air, the so called Radio-Television of Herceg Bosna.  RTV B-H which had 
the greatest feeling for the spirit and sense of the GFAP was not taken out of the hands of the 
nationalists in the Bosniac SDA on time. This is the brutal truth about the legalization of media 
apartheid, which neither the international community nor the local factors has eliminated to date. 
The international community later on gave a flexible interpretation to the spirit of the Constitution, 
but the incomplete, compromising and illogical solutions related to the media never allowed for 
the constituting of a consistent media development strategy in B-H.   
The Peace Implementation Council undertook the duty to interpret the Agreement and to 
provide the High Representative with mostly pragmatic jurisdiction based on which they and other 
international factors could intervene in B-H. During the five years following the war, neither the 
international community nor any of its institutions engaged in B-H produced a comprehensive, 
                                                
3 See more on www.mediaonline.ba, Permits only to professional and solvent media (Dozvole samo profesionalnim i 
solventnim medijima), 2000. 
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scientific, political, technological and economically based strategic document about the 
development of the media in this country. At the same time, there were issued thousands of 
conclusions, opinions, evaluations, guidelines, directives and decisions from various sources, 
which would often repeat themselves, contradict one other, and serve as methodological 
examples of inconsistent planning.   
Media were a topic at almost all of the Peace Implementation Council sessions (25 
meetings had been held by April 2001).4  These were the main foundations for media intervention 
by the international community. In Sintra, (May 1997), for the first time answers were provided to 
the questions of, what to do about media that continue to spread war propaganda ("the High 
Representative can suspend any media network whose program is in constant opposition to the 
spirit and letter of the Peace Agreement"). The directive to establish an Independent Media 
Commission that would regulate the state of electronic media was given in Bonn. The Madrid 
Conference (December 1998) contains the most comprehensive framework for this intervention. 
Named the Media Reform, the document from this conference supports the high Representative 
in his activities in transforming the State media into public services, requires of the donor 
countries to assist in the work of the Independent Media Commission, stimulates the adoption of 
media laws in both Entities, requires of the Croatian RTV and TV Serbia to respect international 
emitting norms, supports OSCE and IMC in bringing about clear election rules regarding media 
behavior. For the first time, an international organ expresses a critical position regarding the 
method of functioning of foreign assistance to media through the position that it is necessary to 
establish stricter criteria for donations. TV OBN and Radio Fern were then still considered to be 
the main factors having a media influence on the population, so full donor support was required 
for their financing.   
Since 1998, the High Representative started working on media reform based on these 
jurisdictions. However, the first attempt at receiving support from the three leaders of ethnic 
parties situated in the Presidency was a debacle. One member (the Serb representative Momčilo 
Krajišnik) did not sign the signed Memorandum on Cooperation regarding this issue, while the 
other two did everything to stall the process. Therefore, in July 1999, the High Representative 
decided to impose a number of regulations, establishing a Public Service at the State and FB-H 
levels, while RTV Srpska was ordered to change its name to TV Republika Srpska and undertake 
its reconstruction towards European standards. The persistent attempt to achieve an agreement 
on reform with the opponents of the idea of reform of the media never had results. When this 
became evident, the international community virtually "kicked" the local factors "out of the game" 
and itself started to create laws and to impose them as being valid, knowing that the local 
authorities would never adopt them while their mandate was running.   
 
 
3. Motives, Forms and Effects of Intervention 
 
The international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina was engaged through the 
international institutions responsible for the implementation of the peace agreement - OHR, 
OSCE, SFOR, UN and its agencies, the European Union and the Council of Europe. The Office 
of the High Representative had jurisdiction within the development of new systems of radio 
broadcasting, the establishment of regulatory bodies, the reconstruction of the State TV network 
and announcement of media laws. OSCE worked on the behavior of media in pre-election 
activities, the protection of journalists’ rights and freedoms and, in accordance with this, worked 
on the preparation of adequate laws. Work on the education of journalists was notable, support 
to professional and union organization, as well as assistance to threatened journalists (Free 
Media - SOS telephone for assistance to journalists).   
The Independent Media Commission (IMC) was established through a special decision of 
the High Representative. It was led by foreign experts and was part of a form of para-State 
institutions with international community jurisdiction. SFOR organized propaganda campaigns for 
its mission, established the radio station Radio Mir (Peace), and provided assistance to media at 
                                                
4 See more on www.ohr.int  
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the local level.  Of the private and non-governmental organizations, the most noted role was 
played by Soros, i.e. the Open Society Foundation B-H.   
Almost every West European country was involved in donor programs though their 
international development agencies or non-governmental foundations. According to data of the 
Media Plan Institute Sarajevo, 20 offices of different organizations working with B-H media were 
in function in Sarajevo in 1997. This trend of interest for the B-H media situation was kept by all 
until 1999, until the start of the Kosovo and Serbian crises. The sudden fall of interest came, not 
because the work in B-H was completed, but because the global machinery of military, political 
and media intervention began to move to another crisis area.   
It is incontestable that the aims of international community intervention in the media field 
were significant for enabling sustainable democratic development of the B-H society. Support to 
free media, the pluralization of media space, freedom from pressure and manipulation of the 
authorities and politics, the creation of modern media legislation together with the application of 
global standards, the transition of State electronic media into public services – these were the 
aims that absorbed the creators of policies in the media sphere. However, the methods used by 
the international community were truly interventionist, mostly based on pragmatic decisions and 
campaigns that aimed to give quick, large results, whose success was, at least publicly, rarely 
analyzed. Even though interventionism was necessary, in particular directly after the war, as well 
as in certain later instances, the absence of readiness to work on a long-term and stable strategic 
project for media development represents the greatest weakness of the action of international 
factors in the B-H media sphere.   
Below we present the most active forms of international community engagement in the 
establishment of a democratic environment in B-H.   
 
 
3.1. Support to the Establishment and Work of Free Media  
 
The international community assessed that the propaganda role of electronic networks in 
the Entities will best be warded off through providing financial and technical assistance for 
establishing new media and sustaining media that have demonstrated their independent 
orientation. Between 1995 and 1997, 66 new media were created, of which 57 were new radio 
and TV stations. According to ICG data, 25,200,000 DEM were spent on local media in 1996.5 It 
is estimated that in that year, an additional 10 million DEM were donated by other organizations 
whose head offices were not registered in Sarajevo. 
The greatest donors were the European Union, Soros, and USAID. The European Union 
donated 33,249,000 DEM to the development of media between 1995 and 2000. USAID gave 74 
million DEM for the same needs. Soros invested 7,583,000 DEM to support for the media over 
seven years (1993 – 1999). During 2000, it abandoned the program of direct assistance to 
media, selecting instead regional programs and more sophisticated socially active activities in the 
field of communication. 
When the invested resources of the largest donors are added, with the assumption that 
the other smaller donors annually invested an additional five million DEM, it can be concluded 
that 135 million DEM were invested during the five post-war years. The absence of international 
coordination and lack of transparency of the sources of information do not allow us to regard this 
sum as definite. The sum may even be greater, since it was impossible to decide how much of  
the resources spent on OBN were included in this sum (according to certain estimates, this may 
be 40 million DEM). If donations for this international project are truly a part of these 135 million 
DEM, one can deduce that only one project spent almost one third of the money intended for the 
local media.   
Estimates as to whom to give donations to were almost without exception in the hands of 
foreign organizations. (Apart from the Open Society Fund B-H which entrusted this work to local 
experts). It is simply incomprehensible that translators and often otherwise unqualified local staff 
in international organizations became the advisors and evaluators of the media situation. It is 
only within the projects that the Stability Pact started to coordinate, that part of the jurisdiction for 
                                                
5 See more in www.crisisweb.org  
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proposing beneficiaries of donations was transferred to local partners (regional media networks 
that are supported by the French and Danish Governments). Certain organizations, such as the 
European Union, underwent a lengthy process for approval of donations (even up to two years 
from time of application) so that certain interventions became inappropriate or, because of 
discrepancies in the dynamics of the influx of resources, difficult to implement.   
Nonetheless, the result of these activities is significant.  The media monopoly of the State 
media was destroyed and a plural media environment created. But the entire project was carried 
out as a campaign, without enough coordination between donors, and this enabled certain 
manipulation among the beneficiaries. A concrete coherent plan of needs was never made, so 
the media arose spontaneously, like mushrooms, on the basis of the donors’ superficial insight 
into the abilities of beneficiaries and worth of frequently improvised projects. Due to this lax 
implementation, a good intention into which large amounts of money were invested turned into a 
disease which now burdens the media situation in B-H. Numerous media with inexperienced and 
insufficiently professional staff, a donor behavior logic, and management which was unprepared 
for its appearance on the media market as well as a program which was not attractive to the 
ever-more selective audience, now find themselves before closure through the application of the 
new regulatory rules.6 Media that, until yesterday, the international community invested large 
amounts of money into, may fall as well, e.g. Radio and TV Tuzla, Zetel in Zenica, Studio 99; or 
they may face enormous difficulties in surmounting market barriers, such as is the case for the 
Sarajevo "Oslobođenje" and "Večernje novine" ("Jutarnje novine") which the international 
community supported for a lengthy period as supporters of free journalism.   
 
 
3.2. Installing Foreign Projects  
 
TV OBN and Radio Fern, both founded in 1996, were the greatest hopes of the 
international community for quick democratic change, the breakdown of communication barriers 
and tolerance and trust building. Leaving the central media under the authorities or the influence 
of the creators of war, the international community quickly understood that State media could not 
be an ally in the implementation of peace, so it decided to install its own projects. In time, OBN 
and FERN truly became media that introduced a new light into media communication; they broke 
down media barriers and became the first media to cover the entire country. However, action for 
the establishment of these networks was also a 'spur of the moment effort' (TV OBN started 
working seven days before the 1996 elections were held) with the ambition – which can be seen 
from today's perspective to have been totally frivolous – that in a couple of weeks of emitting 
programs, these media could eliminate the negative effect of nationalist propaganda created for 
more than five years.  
In fact, in their approach of "their own" and "local projects", the international community 
made the greatest strategic mistake of all. Instead of concentrating efforts to immediately pull out 
the most influential media from under nationalist influences (Srpska RTV, RTV Herceg Bosna 
and RTV B-H) and assisting the creation of one overall Bosnian network, for two years it held 
them aside intending to create competition for them within international networks. Even in 1999, 
according to the research of the MarecoIndeks Bosnia agency, only 5.5 per cent of the 
population watched TV OBN regularly, while 3.6 per cent listened to radio FERN. In contrast to 
this, the two of the most watched television stations in B-H were RTV B-H (25.90%) and RTV RS 
(14.40 %).  
Over the past five years, both projects underwent crises caused by the absence of a long-
term development strategy and unclear legal status, out of which it could not be concluded who 
were the true, and who the formal, owners were. In essence, both networks never became a part 
of the local media environment, since they were intended to serve a missionary role, with which 
nothing could be done once their donations were cancelled or upon finishing their mission. The 
announced departure from the media scene of both projects (FERN has already entered the B-H 
public service system) also came as a consequence, in this area, of the conflicting interests of 
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international donors.  Europe gave precedence to the public service, while the USA preferred the 
concept of developing private media that would be able to fulfill part of the public functions.7   
  
 
3.3. Reconstruction of Public Media  
 
These efforts definitely started late. Two important years in which there was some chance 
to drive the strong propaganda levers out of the hands of shaken-up nationalists in power, 1996 
and 1997, were lost. Thus, the international movements became a sort of substitute for public 
service.  The reform practically began in 1998, but so lackadaisically and without results that in 
1999 the High Representative had to intervene with his decision. At this time, both State RTV 
stations (Sarajevo and Banja Luka) were no longer able to ensure a critical mass of knowledge 
and inventiveness to accept the letter and sense of the reform. Many good journalists and 
engineers had already abandoned these media houses, management had lost all vision for 
development and was completely obsessed with ethnic and Entity interests, while the financial 
situation was catastrophic. Within the reconstruction of State into public media, international 
organizations showed no interest to seek suggestions or support from local experts or institutions 
dealing with media that developed during the post-war years.8  With their often unclear decisions 
and changes of reform concepts, the international factors created even more chaos and 
misunderstanding. They completely neglected the fact that before the war, what was then RTSA 
(RTV B-H) was part of one of the largest RTV systems in Europe and that its experts were able to 
assume the burden of developing a new radio television.   
The reform of State into public services is being implemented without previously 
researching the economic, human and technical resources for this project. According to the 
dictates of political needs and ethnic divisions, the status, legal and organizational framework for 
the new public RTV networks was established first. Independent experts warn that B-H does not 
have economic and creative potential to sustain, in parallel, four public radio and TV networks. 
This project has still not been completed.   
 
 
3.4. Support to Professionalization  
 
The education of journalists and other media staff, and the establishment of deontological 
rules were the basic forms of international assistance to increasing media professionalism. 
However, the international community was not able to simultaneously manage a number of 
parallel actions. New media projects were mostly not supported by education, which, right from 
the start, made these media insufficiently professional and less immune to potential influences of 
authorities.   
A large education campaign was started in 1998. Tens of different West European 
training organizations and field groups hastily established by West European NGOs, simply 
flooded B-H media with training programs, which were often not up to the standards of European 
knowledge and experience. These hunters for donations targeting B-H stood in front of the doors 
of large donors in Europe, recommending their services for work on crisis regions, whereby the 
basic sense of their humanitarian engagement was often lost in favor of their own interests.   
The "quick start" tactic was applied in this case as well. It was not well planned and was 
inadequate for B-H conditions. The principle of short, "flying" courses and training programs with 
insufficiently motivated participants and the "marketplace" approach of the implementers did not 
provide effects that were equal to the resources invested. Only two schools (the Soros Media 
Center and Media Plan Institute), which also assisted the international community, established 
long-term training programs that would last for a number of months at a time.   
                                                
7 According to a number of sources, which the Media Plan Institute relies on, 20 million dollars were invested into OBN 
(without revenues or advertisements), while the annual backing of FERN amount to 1 million dollars. 
8 For example, 9 of the 13 key people that, in 1984 developed and implemented what was then the largest media effort 
– covering the XIV Winter Olympics in Sarajevo still worked in Sarajevo in 1998. 
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The action for the professionalization of media through training programs best 
demonstrates how badly the transfer of knowledge between developed countries and B-H was 
carried out. Instead of the educators leaving local experts behind them, who would be capable of  
continuing the work, they mostly left without trace upon the expiry of donations, leaving an open 
space behind them. Instead of fully using local capacities and experts, they opened their offices, 
brought their experts and often provided training in those skills that local journalists already had 
or for whom local trained staff already existed. It is only recently that certain international 
organizations (e.g. IREX) have attempted to place their support for education into the wider 
context (university education, local educational centers, learning through work) or to support 
equal partnership relations (cooperation of journalist schools from Lile and Sarajevo).   
 
 
 
3.5. The Fight Against the Language of Hate 
 
This target was achieved with the most success. During the first year, tactics were played 
with the media and with nationalist authorities. The reactions of international factors came down 
to inefficient, tragicomic "statements of apology" that were written in the offices of OSCE and 
OHR, and were read upon directive in RTV station programs. A greater effect was achieved 
through the direct intervention on the basis of jurisdiction received by the High Representative 
(taking over the Srpska RTV transmitter and naming the international supervisor, banning work of 
illegal Croat RTV networks). However the most consistent pressure on the media to accept basic 
ethical rules of behavior came with the establishment of the Independent Media Commission 
(1998) which brought a code for managing the RTV program and press, established media 
monitoring and introduced sanctions for violations.   
The language of hate has left its mark. Today it is seen indirectly in hidden forms, in 
particular on topics that evoke memories of the recent past. However, it is questionable as to how 
the request for balanced writing was understood by the media community. Certain media took it 
as a "do not create waves" call, to which certain foreign representatives demonstrated their 
affiliation. Thus the past could sometimes fall under a form of censure and numb the professional 
engagement of the media.9   
 
 
3.6. Media Legislation 
 
The chaotic state of media legislations, in fact the inexistence of any practically 
implementable law relating to the media, required the swift reaction of the international 
community. The international community, completely leaving out the media from the framework of 
the GFAP, was itself responsible for this chaos. This provided the Croat and Serb nationalists 
with the opportunity to answer every attempt at bringing order to the media situation at the State 
level with the attitude "that it was not in agreement with Dayton". However, in 1997, OHR finally 
took the position that a minimum level of jurisdiction should be had at the State level for the 
distribution of frequencies and for emitting public services. This idea was not immediately given 
its practical form. The international community wandered in its choice of solutions – from the idea 
that Entity televisions cooperate and in time establish a joint radio-television, to the establishment 
of an RTV corporation with varied jurisdiction, and finally, to the establishment of three public 
services (two Entity and one State), a corporation for telecommunication and a State regulatory 
agency.   
It is important to note that the international experts engaged for the quick provision of 
proposals were mostly responsible for this wavering in the choice of solutions, as well as the 
responsible media functionaries and various supervisors and agents for reconstruction that were 
                                                
9 A characteristic example is that of the "Oslobođenje" commentator A.S., whom the OSCE Commission for Media 
publicly censured in 1996 for a text in which he expressed public disagreement with the election of Momčilo Krajišnik in 
the B-H Presidency (Krajišnik is now accused for war crimes and is in the Hague). Or the case when TV B-H emitted 
the British documentary "Warriors" for which it was warned by the Independent Media Commission that the program 
"represents Croats in a bad light" prior to the elections.   
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replaced in OHR and other international organizations. All of this, together with the obstruction of 
local authorities and staff apathy in State electronic media, led to the breakdown of all reform 
deadlines. Jobs with 15, 30 and 90-day deadlines were sometimes extended to one to two years. 
The Independent Media Commission is, to date, probably the most skilled international 
institution to be handed over to the local State organs. An additional valuable result, which no 
other international organization in B-H can boast of, was achieved by it: local staff which could 
successfully replace international experts and functionaries were trained. However, one fault in 
the work of the Commission is the fact that it has jurisdiction over establishing the rules and 
monitoring and sanctioning of violations of the rules.  In other words, “the sheriff is also the 
judge.”  The working procedures are not transparent enough, and the appeal process ends in the 
Commission, without the right to appeal to a higher administrative or judicial body.  This is a 
consequence of the Commission being outside the system; it was founded by OHR, but after that 
it formally answers to no one. Its incorporation into the Regulatory Agency for 
Telecommunication, which in time is to become a local institution, is its path into entering the 
organization of the B-H State.   
4. How and Where To from Here? 
 
Five years following Dayton, it can be concluded that the intervention of the international 
community was a complex and expensive action. It gave results, but not as much as was 
invested into the operation. An expensive and slow international bureaucracy implemented many 
projects routinely, without feeling for the specific characteristics, habits and all of the complexity 
of the situation here. Humanitarian aims were often veiled by the interest of organizations that 
implemented this support.   
The international community itself is guilty for the absence of support of local political for 
media projects. It chose nationalist authorities for its partners. However, when they saw that there 
would be no agreement with these authorities, the international participants did not know how to 
find independent experts and institutions as support for their engagement, they did not always 
know how to identify the best local projects and the local implementers with the greatest 
prospects. Even though the human potential has been ravaged, there still are experts in B-H that 
are able to meet international standards and accept the transfer of new knowledge. International 
organizations often did not know how to identify such positive hot-spots. The same intervention 
scheme was applied in B-H as was in many other crisis areas in the world – with a mistrust of 
local capacities. Thus, instead of efforts to develop, as quickly as possible, a sustainable local 
media system that would be capable of planning and implementing its own development, there is 
instead a parallel system of international organizations and projects that are only as sustainable 
as the donor resources backing them. The absence of political will of local authorities to adopt 
modern media laws was replaced by protective measures of the international community. Now, 
under such imposed laws, B-H is approaching Europe, but for this reason the State is absolutely 
incapable of creating and monitoring the implementation of these laws on its own. Forgetting why 
they are in B-H borders on distastefulness and arrogance:  even though these are organizations 
targeting local needs, officially they opt for English names and acronyms - IMC, OBN, FERN, 
PBS. The OHR Internet pages can only be found in English, and international organization press 
conferences were for a long time held without interpreters.   
This text has not analyzed the effects of regional cooperation under the Stability Pact to 
date, since it is too soon for a serious evaluation. However, a number of comments can be made. 
The spirit of the Stability Pact (Sarajevo, July 2000) did not absorb the media and 
international factors in B-H. The media mainly see it as a form of donor compensation for the 
interest lost for B-H, while the international participants in Sarajevo still do not see their activities 
within the context of regional cooperation, at least with regard to media. In fact, it is not known 
upon which principles and which schemes cooperation and development of regional projects can 
be carried out in the local media community. The international actors in Sarajevo, just like the 
local ones, did not do anything to introduce the "local" media and their associations into the 
Stability Pact sphere. Thus, it happened that proposals from B-H did not appear at the 
preliminary meetings of the Round Table for Democracy, while some were lost in the 
administration there. In the preliminary considerations, the Pact administration gave exclusive 
precedence to projects proposed by foreign organizations with bases in large European centers. 
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Not one single project that was originally developed in the regional countries was accepted. This 
decision was changed upon the stormy reaction from a number of countries.   
How and where to go from here?  The international community, to date, mostly did not 
consult local factors to assisting in providing an answer to this question. For the first time since 
Dayton, one international organization, Reporters without Borders, organized a colloquium (Lile, 
France, November 2000) at which the question about the scope of international intervention in 
the media sphere following B-H and Kosovo was posed to around ten local and foreign experts.  
It was concluded that no conclusions for Kosovo were made using the lessons (not) learned in B-
H.   
The coming years will be key years in creating a stable media environment in B-H. Either 
the transfer of responsibility for media development will become part of a systematic 
communication between international factors and the local community or there will occur a 
catastrophic breakdown of everything that was achieved over the past five years. The B-H State 
and its parts has to be trained to develop regulations in the spirit of European standards; 
international regulators’ jurisdiction has to be transferred into the hands of local organs and local 
people, together with all political and legal guarantees that the transfer of jurisdiction will maintain 
and improve professionalism and free development of the media.  
It is unacceptable for the international community to retreat suddenly, before completing 
its work. The decreased influx of donations has to be selectively targeted at the most successful 
projects, to which the market still does not offer enough chances to prove themselves. The 
increase of professionalism, education of journalists and managers, development of local 
organizations that deal with media research, development and education, have to remain 
priorities in the engagement of the international community. Support to establishment of new 
media has to be an absolute exception. It is essential that partnership, rather than subordinate, 
relations are created between foreign and local project implementers in order to enable a transfer 
of knowledge.  
The local people have to take responsibility for the development of the media. They have 
to become the main basis for various media offices, commissions, boards and coordination, out 
of which the majority of foreigners has to slowly retreat. Bodies formed thus have to cooperate 
closely with local independent experts and media institutions that deal with development. The 
establishment of a State media commission, in accordance with the requests of the Stability Pact 
and the Charter on the Freedom of Media (June 2000) can be a path for the integration of 
knowledge and ability of foreign and local experts in the media field and creation of a serious 
development strategy. 
It is necessary to produce a complex study of the strategic direction of media 
development in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The bearer of this study should be a competent local 
organization dealing with the media. Foreign experts, only in an advisory role, would be helpful in 
this effort. Following the completion of this study, it would be useful to plan an international 
conference that would also be organized by local institutions and experts.   
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